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PREFACE
As a part of  its support to the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), NORAD
is financing a Formative Process Research Project to closely follow the development of  the LGRP.
In consultation with the President’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government
(PO-RALG), the project has been organised on the basis of  institutional collaboration
between the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), Dar es Salaam, Chr. Michelsen
Institute (CMI), Bergen, and the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Studies (NIBR),
Oslo. The project will run over the four-year period 2002-2005.
The formative process research concentrates on the following three broad dimensions of
the local government reform:
(1) Governance: local autonomy and citizen participation.
(2) Finances and financial management: accountability, efficiency and local resource
mobilisation.
(3) Service delivery and poverty alleviation: criteria of  success and operational constraints.
This report provides an analysis of  data on ‘Finances and financial management’ from six
councils for the period 2000-2003. The report is written by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad. During
the course of  the work on the report Erasto Ngalewa organised the data collection in the
case councils and provided background information and statistics from PO-RALG. Florida
Henjewele and Geoffrey Mwambe were responsible for collecting data from the case councils,
while Knut Nygaard systematised relevant information based on the citizens’ survey.
Useful comments and suggestions for improvements of  a previous draft were received
from two anonymous referees. Special thanks to the Local Government Reform Team
(PO-RALG) and the contact persons in the case councils for their assistance, and to the
many people in the councils visited who took the time to speak with us. Points of  view and
any remaining errors should be attributed to the author.
Bergen and Dar es Salaam,
30 June 2004
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ABSTRACT
The major focus of  the Formative Process Research Programme is to observe changes in
local authorities in the provision of  basic services to the public. Moreover, the research
aims to analyse changes in local authorities’ capacity for financial management and revenue
enhancement, and changes relating to governance, including accountability and
responsiveness of  the local government.
This report is an overview of  local government finances and financial management in six
councils in Tanzania: Bagamoyo District Council, Ilala Municipal Council, Iringa District
Council, Kilosa District Council, Moshi District Council and Mwanza City Council. The
data cover the period 2000-2003 and provide a reference point for the situation in the six
councils with respect to various dimensions of  local government finances and financial
management in this period. The following themes are covered by the study: (a) the degree
of  fiscal autonomy; (b) methods of  revenue collection; (c) financial management, including
budgeting, accounting and auditing; (d) transparency in fiscal and financial affairs; and (e)
tax compliance and fiscal corruption. In essence, a small, common database is developed
for all the case councils.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 Introduction
The report presents and analyses data on ‘finances and financial management’ in six councils
in Tanzania: Bagamoyo DC, Ilala MC, Iringa DC, Kilosa DC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC.
The data cover the period 2000-2003, and provide a reference point for the situation in the
six councils with respect to various dimensions of  local government finances and financial
management in this period. The following key indicators are used as reference points: (i) the
degree of  fiscal autonomy; (ii) financial management, including budgeting, accounting and
auditing; (iii) methods of  revenue collection; (iv) transparency in fiscal and financial affairs;
and (v) tax compliance and fiscal corruption in the case councils. A brief  summary of  key
findings are presented below.
2 Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy of  district councils is limited both with respect to revenues and expenditures.
The four rural councils in our sample generated less than 17% of  their total revenues from
own sources in 2002. For Moshi DC, the percentage was less than 10%. The rationalisation
and abolishment of many local revenue sources in June 2003 has most likely reduced the
already limited fiscal autonomy of  district councils even further. In contrast, the two urban
councils, Ilala MC and Mwanza CC, are less dependent on central government grants than
the rural councils. In 2002, Ilala MC generated about 64% of  its revenue through own
sources and Mwanza CC almost 48%. However, none of  the six case councils have
experienced an increase in their own generated revenue share of  total revenues during the
three year period 1999-2002. In Bagamoyo DC, Iringa DC and Mwanza CC, there is a clear
downward trend in own revenues as a percentage of  total revenues.
A similar picture applies with respect to expenditures since the grants from the central
government are conditional and earmarked for specific sectors. In general, we observe a
considerable annual increase in total expenditures in the case councils during the period
2000-2002, although the annual fluctuations in some councils are substantial. Hence, from
2000 to 2001, Moshi DC experienced a significant decline in its expenditure level (-18.2%),
and Bagamoyo DC saw a decline of  22.8% in total expenditures from 2001 to 2002. But
from 2001 to 2002, Moshi DC, however, saw an increase of more than 95% in its level of
expenditures. For Iringa DC and Kilosa DC, expenditure levels increased by 78% and 59%,
respectively, from 2001 to 2002.
The allocation of  expenditures between priority sectors shows substantial differences between
the case councils. In particular, this is the case for allocations to the education sector, while
we observe less difference between the allocations to the health sector. For instance, while
Kilosa allocated about 22% of  total expenditures to education in 2002, the corresponding
figure for Moshi DC was 66%. On average, the allocation to the health sector in the case
councils was around 10% of  total expenditures in 2002.
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3 Methods of  Revenue Collection
Local government tax collection is the responsibility of  the council staff  and is completely
separated from the central government. In district councils, it is organised around three
levels, namely the council headquarters, the wards and the village levels. At the council
headquarters the responsibility for tax collection rests with the council treasury, headed by
the Treasurer. At the ward levels, the responsibility rests with the office of  the Ward Executive
Officer (WEO).  The WEO also handles developmental issues and law-and-order functions
at that level. For this purpose the local militia is at their disposal. In wards with greater
revenue potential there will also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to support the WEO.
At the village level, the responsibility rests with the office of  the village executive officer
(VEO). The VEO is also responsible for supervising village developmental activities and to
maintaining law and order. In addition, the VEOs often function as secretaries of  the Village
Councils.
In practice, the organisation of  tax collection varies between councils. For instance, in some
councils the village level has been excluded from collection, and the task is taken over by the
ward level. This is due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the village
level. Most case councils have introduced new methods to increase revenues from existing
sources by outsourcing some of  the revenue collection to private collectors to increase
revenues from existing sources. Only in Iringa DC all own revenues are collected by the
council staff.
4 Financial Management
With respect to the quality of  financial management our research cannot, at this stage,
identify any differences between the case councils that were part of  the initial LGRP phase
1 and those which were not. Gaps between budgets and accounts provide an indication of
the quality and realism of  budgeting in the case councils. In Ilala MC and Bagamoyo DC,
the annual revenue estimates in the period 2000-2002 are within a 10% range of  the reported
revenues. For the four other councils, the gaps between accounts and budgets in 2002 were
between 13% (Kilosa) and 35% (Iringa). No trend can be derived from the data, as the gaps
between reported and projected revenues vary from year to year in all councils. For some
councils, and in particular for Moshi DC, the annual fluctuations are substantial and reflect
weak budgeting.
Budgeting and accounting are still carried out manually in all the six case councils. Only
Kilosa applies in practice PLATINUM in combination with a manual system. Ilala MC has
started to implement PLATINUM, and Epicor is in place in Mwanza CC. In contrast,
Bagamoyo, Iringa and Moshi have not yet started to computerise financial management and
planning.
The staffing situation in the case councils’ treasury departments differs both with respect to
the number of  staff members and their qualifications. This partly reflects the size of  the
ix
Local Government Finances and Financial Management in Tanzania
councils. For instance, Mwanza CC has 42 staff members in the Treasury Department
compared to 17 in the Treasury in Bagamoyo. To some extent it also reflects that some
councils are more attractive to work in compared to others, for instance llala versus Iringa.
However, a general picture from the Treasury Departments is that about one third or less
of  the staff  are trained accountants. The remaining majority of  staff  have either no formal
training in accounting or only hold certificates.
The Internal Auditor’s Office in the case councils are either weakly staffed or not staffed at
all. Bagamoyo, during the time of  study, had no internal auditor in place, and in Iringa DC
the vacant position was not filled until mid-2003. Hence, until recently the internal auditing
in Iringa DC was carried out by the Treasury staff  themselves. This has undermined the
credibility of  the auditing process.
In the most recent report from the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) more councils
than before received a ‘clean’ statement on their accounts. This applies to Ilala MC, Kilosa
DC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC, which all received clean reports in 2001. But it is too early
to state whether this is a trend or only accidental. To our knowledge, the quality of  the
CAG’s reports on local authorities has not been evaluated. Hence, one should be cautious
to draw conclusions based on the CAG’s findings. Preliminary observations from the case
councils indicate, however, that no significant improvements have taken place in recent
years to curb corruption, with a possible exception for Kilosa DC, which seems to have
experienced positive managerial changes since mid-2002.
5 Transparency in Financial and Fiscal Affairs
All the case councils report that they disseminate information on financial and fiscal affairs
to the public through meetings organised by the council, including full council meetings,
ward and village meetings. Ilala MC, Kilosa DC and Mwanza CC also reported that they
used newspapers to inform citizens. Moreover, notice boards at ward and council headquarters
were used in Ilala MC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC. However, there are reasons to question
the effectiveness of  these dissemination mechanisms and whether the information actually
reaches the public. Few of  the respondents in a recently conducted citizens’ survey, covering
1260 respondents in the case councils, said they had seen some information about local
government finances. As many as 86% of  all the respondents said they had never received
information on the amount of  tax revenues and user charges collected in their area. There
are, however, large variations across councils. The respondents in Kilosa DC appear to be
the relatively best informed, whereas the highest levels of  ignorance among citizens with
regard to tax collection were found in the urban councils Ilala MC and Mwanza CC. Among
those who had received this kind of  information from the council, the Village Executive
Officers (VEOs) were in general the most likely institution to have issued it.
In contrast, the large majority (77.5% of  the respondents) had seen posters for HIV/AIDS.
Moreover, when asked from where they received information on various government policies,
such as tax policy, HIV/AIDS control policy, health policy, education policy, the local
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government reform etc., radio was the media the majority of  the respondents referred to.
Newspapers and other forms of  information dissemination used by the local authorities
seemed to play a minor role.
6 Tax Compliance and Fiscal Corruption
In all the case councils, taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay taxes and fees was reported as a
major obstacle to enhancing local government revenues. The citizens’ survey provided some
indications on factors that impact on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.
Only 28.6% of  the respondents see taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay to be a problem. In
contrast, too high taxes (47.9% of  the respondents) and dishonest tax collectors (45.7%)
were perceived to be major problems. However, the most serious problem perceived by a
majority of  the respondents (58.4%) was that the money collected was not spent on public
services.  With respect to the urban-rural divide which were observed on other issues, the
respondents in Ilala MC and Mwanza CC perceived that too many taxes/fees and harassment
by tax collectors were larger problems compared to what was the case for the respondents
in the rural councils.
Dissatisfaction on poor linkages between taxes paid and service delivery showed no rural-
urban divide. In general, taxes were widely perceived to be unfair. Firstly, only 9% of  the
respondents agreed with the statement that ‘most of  the tax revenues collected in the area
is used for reciprocal services’. Secondly, the majority of  all respondents (51%) held the
view that people should deny paying taxes until services improved. Thirdly, 73% of  the
respondents said they would be willing to pay more taxes in exchange for improved services.
The respondents in Iringa DC were, however, least inclined to willingly increase tax payments
in exchange for service improvements.
Almost 50% of  all respondents thought that people would evade taxes if  they could get
away with it. However, we observed some differences between the case councils. While 59%
of  the respondents in Moshi DC answered that they believed most taxpayers would evade
if  they thought they could get away with it, the corresponding figure for Kilosa DC was
38.6%. The most cited reason for tax compliance (46%), on the other hand, was that people
paid because they ‘will avoid disturbances’. Only 22.6% of  the respondents said that they
believe people paid because they anticipated public services.
Corruption was perceived to be a problem in all the six case councils. But, there were large
differences across councils with respect to the extent of  corruption. In Kilosa DC, 40% of
the respondents viewed corruption as a serious problem, compared to 72% in Moshi DC.
Moreover, in Kilosa 40% of  the respondents said they had seen a decline in the level of
corruption during the last two years, whereas in Moshi 53% had observed an increase.
There was agreement across councils that corruption had to be combated at every
opportunity.
Almost one third (27%) of  the respondents thought that misuse of  tax revenues was
unavoidable, though there were large variations across councils. Only 11% of  respondents
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in Iringa DC saw misuse as unavoidable, compared to as many as 41% in Moshi DC. In
general, respondents favour village authorities over ward, council and parliamentarians to
truthfully allocate tax revenues. Another interesting observation was the relatively high degree
of  trust in the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).
As many as 64% of  all respondents thought that reporting misuse of  tax revenue to a
journalist would help reduce this form of  corruption. Some respondents did not think any
measures could impact on the extent of  tax revenue misuse. The most frequent reason
given for this attitude was the view that ‘all civil servants are corrupt and they protect each
other’. This attitude reflects that much is left to be done to build trust-relations between the
local authorities and citizens.
The most favoured measures to improve the use of  tax revenues, as expressed by the
respondents, are stronger punishment of  government employees and politicians. These
measures apply across all the case councils. More information to the public on the allocation
of  tax revenues was also perceived to be a potentially important measure to improve the use
of  revenues.
7 Conclusions
One major administrative problem today for many councils is their inability to collect fully
the revenue due to them. Fundamental issues to be addressed in this context are to redesign
the current local revenue structure and to strengthen financial management. Moreover,
measures are required to enhance taxpayers’ compliance and to improve the accountability
of  tax collectors and councillors.
A fundamental requirement when further redesigning the local tax system is greater emphasis
on the cost-effectiveness of  revenue collection, taking into account not only the direct costs
of  tax administration, but also the overall costs to the economy, including the compliance
costs to the taxpayers. In addition, losses through corruption and tax evasion need to be
reduced. To achieve these aims, there is a need for further simplification of  the licence and
fee structures by reducing the number of  rates and coverage. Fees and licences that have
regulatory functions, such as sand fees, hunting and business licences, should be harmonised
with central government taxes, to avoid double taxation and conflicts with national
development policies such as employment creation and environmental protection.
Furthermore, uniform rates on agricultural taxes (crop cess) are necessary to minimise
distortions. In this context it might be worth considering the possibility to centralise the
collection of  certain local taxes. For instance, cess on export crops could be collected by the
Tanzania Revenue Authority at their points of  export.
More realism is required when it comes to the implementation of  a well functioning property
tax system. The municipalities’ capacity and capability to administer the property tax have,
in general, proved to be inadequate. Hence, it has been difficult for many councils both to
maintain the current property valuation registers and to continue the property valuation
exercises. It is, therefore, a need to reassess the basis of  the property tax in urban councils
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and to implement a more simple and coherent approach to the valuation provision, which
takes into consideration administrative capacity and capability constraints facing the councils.
Moreover, the experiences from urban councils advocate cautiousness when extending
property tax to district councils.
Transparency with respect to budgets and accounts is at the heart of  local government
accountability. Local authorities publish information on revenues collected and allocations
of  funds, as they are obliged to according to the Local Authority Financial Memorandum
1997. However, at present much of  this information does not reach or is not understood by
the general public. Public notices gazetted in newspapers or posted on notice boards at the
council headquarters are often presented in a relatively complicated and technical way which
is hard to understand by ordinary citizens. Many people do not take interest in reading
notices and newspapers. A main challenge is therefore to provide information on fiscal
issues in ways which are understandable and which reach the general public. The successful
dissemination of  information on HIV/AIDS prevention may provide useful lessons for
how to design and disseminate information on budgets and accounts to the communities.
Written and oral methods of  dissemination should be combined, including information
submitted at service outlets such as schools and dispensaries, and at village and ward offices.
More active use of  the VEOs and mtaa leaders to communicate such information to citizens
may also pay high dividends as the experiences from Kilosa and Iringa indicate. Urban
councils would in general require additional measures compared to rural councils, due to
the often high mobility and turnover of  residents that make it more difficult to reach citizens
with such information.
Improved information to the public on budgets and accounts may improve the opportunities
for citizens to exercise their voice and hold local authorities accountable. It is, however,
important to stress that encouraging citizens and the civil society to engage in fiscal and
financial monitoring at the local level does not imply that such measures should replace
formal auditing and accounting mechanisms. Nor does it imply that such measures will
weaken the formal accountability mechanisms. On the contrary, it can strengthen the
legitimacy and standing of  local authorities in the communities by contributing with
complementary measures to improved control of  revenue collection and expenditures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The overall objective of  the Formative Process Research Project on the local government
reform in Tanzania is to document the processes of  change and impacts of  the Local
Government Reform Programme (LGRP) in Tanzania, and to provide managers and key
stakeholders with operationally relevant data and analyses of  lessons learned during
implementation of  the reform.
This report presents and analyses data on ‘finances and financial management’ in six councils
in Tanzania. These are: Bagamoyo District Council, Ilala Municipal Council, Iringa District
Council, Kilosa District Council, Moshi District Council, and Mwanza City Council. The
data cover the period 2000-2003, and provide a reference point for the situation in the six
councils with respect to various dimensions of  local government finances and financial
management in this period.1 The following themes are covered by the study: (i) the degree
of  fiscal autonomy; (ii) financial management, including budgeting, accounting and auditing;
(iii) methods of  revenue collection; (iv) transparency in fiscal and financial affairs; and (v)
tax compliance and fiscal corruption. In essence, a small, common database is developed
for all case councils.
The case councils were selected on the basis of  the following criteria (see the Inception
Report, 30 October 2002):
• variations in resource bases;
• rural-urban variations;
• degree of  inclusion in the LGRP;
• degree of  donor presence or support; and
• composition of  political parties.
The rationale of  also including councils for in depth studies that did not take part in the
initial phase 1 of  the reform (i.e., Bagamoyo DC, Kilosa DC and Moshi DC), was to establish
to what extent changes occur even without the incentives of  the Local Government Reform
– in other words, to identify – through the method of  individualising or contrasting
comparison - reform or change agents that are located at the local level or in other sectors
than those driving the LGR. The report does not aim to explore causalities (e.g., what
specific reform measures lead to the specific changes observed), but focuses instead on
what changes are or can be observed in each of  the case councils with respect to finances
and financial management over the period of  analysis. Furthermore, the report aims to
function as a ‘generator of  ideas’ for further analysis of  processes of  change to be studied.
The data on expenditures, finances and financial management are derived on the basis of  a
combination of  quantitative and qualitative methodologies:
1 This report does not discuss finances and financial management at lower local government levels (i.e. wards
and villages/mitaa). Details on these issues are found in URT (2003a). Currently, there are about 2,400 wards
in Tanzania and more than 9,000 registered villages. Villages have at least 250 households and are sub-divided
into harmlets. On average there are about 3 hamlets per village.
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• Citizens’ survey comprising 1260 respondents; i.e. 210 respondents in each case
council;
• Quantitative data collected in the case councils and from PO-RALG;
• Quantitative data submitted by contact persons in the case councils;
• Qualitative research in each council, ward and village designed especially to examine
events of  change due to the LGR (see the Fieldwork Manual 2003 for details on key
informers interviewed); and
• Qualitative research at the central level, including ministries, national interest
organisations (including ALAT), national NGOs, and major donors in order to explore
major changes in the relations between local and central government responsibilities
due to the LGR, and variations between central level stakeholders.
The report is organised as follows: Chapter 2 focuses on fiscal autonomy. The councils’
share of  own revenues and grants from the central government is compared, and changes
over time discussed, reflecting the degree of  fiscal autonomy in the councils. The Chapter
also presents the status of  and recent changes in local government expenditures, and
allocations to the priority sectors education and health in each of  the six case councils. In
Chapter 3 modes of  revenue collection are discussed. The focus of  Chapter 4 is financial
management in the case councils. Several indicators of  the status of  and changes in financial
management are applied, including staffing of  the councils’ finance departments, the internal
auditors’ offices and computerisation of  the treasury departments. Moreover, the status for
and recent changes in internal and external audit queries are presented. Thereafter, as an
indicator of  the quality of  budgeting, the gap between budgeted and accounted revenues in
the case councils is discussed. Finally, the status of  gender budgeting is presented. Then, in
Chapter 5, transparency in financial and fiscal affairs is presented, including how fiscal
information is disseminated to the public in the case councils. Chapter 6 provides a detailed
account of  citizens’ perceptions on tax compliance and fiscal corruption in the case councils.
These perceptions provide indications on citizens’ trust in the local governments. Finally,
Chapter 7 concludes.
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2 FISCAL AUTONOMY
2.1 Revenues
Local authorities have three major sources of  funding: own revenues, central government
transfers, and development aid (Fjeldstad, 2003). In addition, user charges and various forms
of  self-help activities contribute to the running and maintenance of  public services such as
primary schools and health facilities. Although data on the extent of  user charges and self-
help activities is not available, some studies from the late 1990s indicate that these
contributions are significant and increasing (Cooksey & Mmuya 1997; Semboja & Therkildsen
1995). Recent update on this development is not available.
Local governments’ own revenues represented less than 6% of  total national tax revenues
in Tanzania in 2002. This share had then been almost unchanged since 1996. However, the
share dropped substantially in FY 2003 following the rationalisation of  local taxes, including
the abolishment of  development levy (URT, 2003b). Own generated revenues in district
councils are mainly used to finance operational costs, in particular salaries for the lower
cadre of  local government employees and sitting allowances for councillors. The lion’s share
of  the operational costs in district councils, however, is funded by central government
transfers. In 2002, these transfers funded on average 85-90% of  the total operational costs
in district councils. With respect to investments, many councils are almost completely
dependent on transfers from the central level, including donor funding.2
2.1.1 Own revenues
Table 1 shows the changes in annual own revenues for the period 2000-2002. In all the case
councils except for Mwanza CC, own revenues increased from year 2000 to 2001 by two-
digit figures (in nominal terms). For Moshi DC the annual increase was more than 85% and
for Kilosa almost 30%. Kilosa DC and Ilala MC also experienced a two-digit increase in
own revenues from 2001 to 2002, i.e. 30.7% and 16%, respectively. In contrast, Moshi DC
and Iringa DC both experienced negative changes in own revenue generation, i.e. -8% and
-2.4%, respectively, while Bagamoyo DC and Mwanza CC only experienced marginal changes
in own revenue generation compared to the previous year.
Figure 1 presents the trend of  reported own revenues in the six case councils during the
period 2000-2002 (in TSh). No clear pattern can be observed from the case councils with
respect to own revenue generation during this period. For some councils, including Ilala
MC and Kilosa DC, and to a less extent for Bagamoyo DC and Mwanza CC, own revenues
are increasing in nominal terms. For Iringa DC and Moshi DC, however, revenues fluctuated
in nominal terms over this period.
2 According to information from the LGRT (December 2003), PO-LARG plans to carry out a detailed study to
determine teh expenditure composition of  local authorities (e.g. the allocations to Personal Emoluments and
Operational Costs), and the share of  these costs which are funded by central government grants and the council’s
own revenues, respectively.
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Source: Data provided from PO-RALG based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
Table 1: Annual changes in own revenues, 2000-2002 (in %)
Council 2000-2001 2001-2002
Bagamoyo DC 20.2 4.5
Ilala MC 14.5 16.0
Iringa DC 10.9 -2.4
Kilosa DC 29.1 30.7
Moshi DC 86.4 -8.0
Mwanza CC 8.2 1.9
Table 2 presents the composition of  own revenue sources in each of  the six case councils in
2002 and 2003.  The table shows that there are huge differences between urban and rural
councils in this respect.  While development levy contributed with 56.2% of  total own
revenues in Iringa DC and 36.7% in Kilosa DC in 2002, the corresponding figures were
0.6% for Ilala MC and 13.2% for Mwanza CC.  The city service levy and various licences
(including business licences), fees and others, are most important in the urban councils.
However, the table also shows substantial differences between the four rural councils.
Development levy played a relatively minor role in Bagamoyo DC and Moshi DC in 2002,
while business and other licences and fees were more important.  In Moshi DC crop cess
was the major own revenue source in 2002.
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Figure 1: Own Revenues, 1999 - 2002 (Actuals)
A
m
o
u
n
t 
(i
n
 T
sh
s.
)
5Local Government Finances and Financial Management in Tanzania
A
.D
is
tr
ic
t c
as
e 
co
un
ci
ls
B
ag
am
oy
o 
D
C
Ir
in
ga
 D
C
K
ilo
sa
 D
C
M
os
hi
 D
C
R
ev
em
ue
s 
So
ur
ce
s
20
02
%
20
03
%
20
02
%
20
03
%
20
02
%
20
03
%
20
02
%
20
03
%
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t l
ev
y
13
.7
4.
5
25
2.
3
56
.2
13
8.
4
31
.7
60
.8
11
.0
C
ro
p 
ce
ss
25
.7
8.
5
39
.7
10
.8
42
.9
9.
6
57
.6
23
.9
10
4.
6
24
.0
18
.0
15
.6
20
1.
3
36
.4
15
8.
7
36
.3
Li
ve
st
oc
k 
ce
ss
0
40
.3
9.
0
50
.1
20
.8
13
.2
3.
0
0.
4
0.
1
3.
0
0.
7
Bu
sin
es
s 
lic
en
ce
s
68
.3
22
.5
73
.1
19
.8
32
.1
7.
1
34
.6
14
.4
36
.1
8.
3
30
.9
26
.8
51
.9
9.
4
27
.0
6.
2
M
ar
ke
t f
ee
s
20
.7
6.
8
20
.0
5.
4
1.
8
0.
4
2.
1
0.
9
16
.2
3.
7
14
.9
12
.9
25
.2
4.
6
46
.2
10
.6
O
th
er
 ta
xe
s
0.
6
0.
2
2.
0
0.
5
18
.8
4.
2
25
.3
10
.5
25
.5
5.
8
10
.2
8.
8
11
.1
2.
0
28
.1
6.
4
O
th
er
 f
ee
s,l
ic
en
ce
s&
fin
es
15
5.
1
51
.1
22
1.
7
60
.1
50
.9
11
.3
53
.8
22
.3
66
.4
15
.2
41
.5
35
.9
94
.2
17
.0
74
.1
17
.0
M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s
19
.5
6.
4
12
.4
3.
4
10
.1
2.
2
17
.2
7.
2
35
.6
8.
2
10
7.
4
19
.4
99
.6
22
.8
T
ot
al
30
3.
6
10
0
36
8.
8
10
0
44
9.
2
10
0
24
0.
7
10
0
43
6.
1
10
0
11
5.
4
10
0
55
2.
5
10
0
43
6.
7
10
0
T
ab
le
 2
: L
oc
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
e 
so
ur
ce
s,
 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
03
* 
(i
n 
M
ill
. T
sh
 a
nd
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
)
B
: 
U
rb
an
 c
as
e 
co
un
ci
ls
Il
al
a 
M
C
M
w
an
za
 C
C
R
ev
en
ue
 s
ou
rc
es
20
02
%
20
03
%
20
02
%
20
03
%
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t l
ev
y
36
.3
0.
6
27
9.
5
13
.2
Pr
op
er
ty
 ta
xe
s
69
0.
8
11
.5
1,
11
5.
3
16
.3
24
3.
6
11
.5
44
2.
2
21
.6
B
us
in
es
s 
lic
en
ce
s
1,
19
4.
5
19
.9
1,
94
3.
5
28
.4
36
4.
7
17
.3
39
1.
7
19
.2
C
ity
 S
er
vi
ce
 le
vy
2,
04
4.
2
34
.1
2,
30
3.
9
33
.6
45
2.
9
21
.5
47
7.
9
23
.4
O
th
er
 ta
xe
s
16
.4
0.
3
80
.5
1.
2
12
1.
2
5.
7
48
5.
9
23
.8
O
th
er
 f
ee
s,
 li
ce
nc
es
 &
 f
in
es
1,
69
7.
1
28
.3
1,
10
9.
3
16
.2
46
0.
6
21
.8
24
4.
3
11
.9
M
is
ce
lla
ne
ou
s
31
1.
3
5.
2
30
1.
3
4.
4
18
8.
4
8.
9
2.
5
0.
1
To
ta
l
5,
99
0.
6
10
0
6,
85
3.
9
10
0
2,
11
1.
2
10
0
2,
04
4.
5
10
0
So
ur
ces
: C
om
pi
le
d 
by
 th
e 
au
th
or
s 
ba
sin
g 
on
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 th
e 
co
un
ci
ls’
 ‘A
bs
tra
ct
s o
f 
Fi
na
l A
cc
ou
nt
s 
(2
00
2)
’ a
nd
 th
e 
co
un
ci
ls’
‘B
ud
ge
t E
st
im
at
es
 (2
00
3)
’.
6Fjeldstad, Henjewele, Mwambe, Ngalewa and Nygaard
2.1.2 Grants
Table 3 shows annual changes in grants from the central government to each of  the six case
councils. The grants are conditional and earmarked for specific sectors. Figure 2 also shows
total grants are increasing annually over the period in question. There was a relatively large
one-time increase in grants from fiscal year 1999/00 to FY 2000/01.3 For Kilosa, the increase
from FY 1999/00 to FY 2000/01 was about 145%, and for the other councils about 50%.
This increase was mainly due to the revamped Local Government Reform Programme
(LGRP) which started to be implemented in 1999 (IMF, 2003).4 In the following fiscal year,
however, the increase in grants was very modest, except for Bagamoyo where the grants
increased by almost 20% compared to the previous fiscal year.
Table 3: Annual changes in central government grants to the case councils, 1999/00
– 2001/02 (in %)
Councils 1999/00-2000/01 2000/01-2001/02 2001/02 – 2002/03
Bagamoyo DC 56.1 19.5 21.6
Ilala MC n.a. 8.0 36.1
Iringa DC 53.6 3.1 34.8
Kilosa DC 145.4 5.4 26.6
Moshi DC 49.7 5.8 18.5
Mwanza CC 48.6 6.0 35.8
Sources: Compiled by the authors; data for 1999/00-2000/01 is based on ‘Appendices to Volume
III, Estimates of  Public Expenditure Supply Vote (Regional)’ and data for 2001/02-2002/03 is
based on ’Budget speeches by minister responsible for local government’.
3 Ilala MC was established in 2000.
4 The Government (PO-RALG) and the World Bank, with support of  donors who form the Com-
mon Basket Fund, are preparing a new credit - the Local Government Support Programme (LGSP),
which will provide funding to local authorities for a variety of  purposes including investment in local
infrastructure. See PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2003) for further details on the design of  teh LGSP.
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2.1.3 Total revenues: Grants and own sources
As shown in Table 4 and Figure 3, the major revenue source for district councils is grants
from the central level. In Moshi DC, for instance, own revenues corresponded only to
10.8% of  grants allocated from the centre in FY 2001/02. The corresponding figures for
Kilosa, Bagamoyo and Iringa DC, were 15.1%, 18.2% and 20.3%, respectively. In contrast,
the two urban councils in our sample generate a major share of  their total revenues from
own sources. In Ilala MC, for instance, own revenues correspond to more than 176% of  the
transfers from the centre, while the corresponding figure for Mwanza CC is 91.8% in FY
2001/02. Compared to total council revenues (Table 5), Ilala MC generated more than 60%
of  total revenues from its own sources in 2002, compared to about 48% in Mwanza CC.
Table 4: Own revenues in % of  grants (1999-2002)
Councils 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02
Bagamoyo DC 27.1 20.8 18.2
Ilala MC n.a. 164.3 176.6
Iringa DC 29.7 21.4 20.3
Kilosa DC 23.1 12.2 15.1
Moshi DC 10.0 12.4 10.8
Mwanza CC 131.1 95.5 91.8
Sources: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts ‘and
‘Appendices to Volume III, Estimates of  Public Expenditure Supply Vote (Regional)’.
Sources: Compiled by the authors basing on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’ and
‘Appendices to Volume III, Estimates of  Public Expenditure Supply Vote (Regional)’.
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In Table 5 own revenues in percentage of  total council revenues have been presented. The
own revenue trend for the three year period 1999/00-2001/02 is not encouraging for several
of  the case councils. Only Ilala MC has experienced an increase in own revenues’ share of
total revenues during the three year period, from 58.2% in 2000 to 63.8% in 2002. In
Bagamoyo, Iringa, and Mwanza there is a clear downward trend in own revenues as percentage
of  total revenues, while Kilosa and Moshi have ‘stabilised’ around 13% and 10%, respectively.
These figures reflect that the annual increase in grants from the central government (Table
3) has been larger in most councils than the corresponding annual change in own revenues
(Table 1).
Table 5: Own revenues in % of  total revenues 
Council 2000 2001 2002
Bagamoyo DC 21.3 17.2 15.4
Ilala MC 58.2 62.2 63.8
Iringa DC 22.9 17.7 16.9
Kilosa DC 18.8 10.8 13.1
Moshi DC 9.1 11.0 9.8
Mwanza CC 56.7 48.8 47.9
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’ and ‘Appen-
dices to Volume III, Estimates of  Public Expenditure Supply Vote (Regional)’.
Table 6: Annual changes (%)  in total revenues (grants and own revenues)
Council 2000-2001 2001-2002
Bagamoyo DC 48.4 17.0
Ilala MC 84.2 13.0
Iringa DC 43.8 2.1
Kilosa DC 123.6 8.1
Moshi DC 53.0 4.3
Mwanza CC 25.7 4.0
Sources: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’ and
‘Appendices to Volume III, Estimates of  Public Expenditure Supply Vote (Regional)’.
Table 6 shows the annual percentage changes in total revenues for the case councils. While
the councils experienced a quite dramatic annual increase in revenues from 2000 to 2001,
mainly due to increased grants from the centre, the annual increase the following years was
quite modest, except for Bagamoyo DC (17%) and Ilala MC (13%).
To summarise, fiscal autonomy in district councils is limited both with respect to revenues
and expenditures. 80-90% of  total revenues in rural councils are conditional grants. Moshi
DC generated only 9% of  its total revenues from own sources in 2002. The corresponding
10
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figure for Kilosa was 10% of  which development levy was the most important source till
June 2003. However, the rationalisation of many local revenue sources in June 2003 has
reduced the already limited fiscal autonomy even further. The picture is different in the two
urban councils, which generates a substantial part of  their revenues from own sources, i.e.
64% in Ilala MC and about 48% in Mwanza. The urban-rural divide with respect to own
revenue generation reflects the much wider revenue bases available in densely populated
urban settings (such as business licences, city service levy and property taxes). It also reflects
that poverty in Tanzania is most widespread in rural areas. Hence, the revenue potential is
much more limited in rural settings.
2.2 Expenditures
In general, we observe a substantial annual increase in total expenditures in the case councils
during the period 2000-2002 (see Table 7). However, in 2000-2001, Moshi DC experienced
a significant decline in its expenditure level (-18.2%), and the same applies for Bagamoyo
DC which saw a decline of  22.8% in total expenditures from 2001 to 2002. But from 2001
to 2002, Moshi DC saw an increase in its level of  expenditures of more than 95%. For
Iringa DC and Kilosa DC, expenditure levels increased from 2001 to 2002 by 78% and
59%, respectively.
Table 7: Annual changes in total expenditures as reported by the six case councils
(in %)
Councils 2000-2001 2001-2002
Bagamoyo DC 25.2 -22.8
Ilala MC 44.6 24.2
Iringa DC 13.6 78.0
Kilosa DC 21.7 59.3
Moshi DC -18.2 95.5
Mwanza CC 21.6 2.6
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
The similar picture is presented in Figure 4, which shows total expenditures in the six case
councils as reported in the council accounts (in TSh).
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The allocation of  expenditures between priority sectors shows substantial differences between
the case councils. In particular, this is the case for allocations to the education sector (Table
8), while we observe less difference between the allocations to the health sector (Table 9).
2.2.1 Allocations to the education sector
Table 8 shows the allocation to the education sector as share of  total council expenditures.
Relatively high differences in the allocations can be observed between the case councils. For
instance, while the allocation to the education sector in Kilosa represented about 22% of  total
expenditures in 2002, the corresponding figure for Moshi was 66%. In Iringa DC about 60%
of  the total expenditures were allocated to education. The low figure for Kilosa might, however,
be seen in connection with a relatively high allocation to education in 2001 (i.e., more than
60% of  total expenditures). For the remaining councils (Bagamoyo, Ilala and Mwanza), the
education sector receives around 35% of  the total expenditures. With exception for Kilosa
DC, the case councils’ annual allocation to education has remained relatively stable during the
period 2000-2002 (i.e. as share of  total expenditures).
Table 8: Primary education expenditures in % of  total expenditures
Council FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002
Bagamoyo DC n.a 32.4 38.4
Ilala MC 34.7 30.6 32.5
Iringa DC 59.5 46.5 59.7
Kilosa DC 55.5 61.4 22.3
Moshi DC 71.0 70.2 66.0
Mwanza CC 39.3 35.7 35.3
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
2.2.2 Allocations to the health sector
Table 9 shows the annual expenditures to the health sector as share of  total expenditures.
While Ilala MC allocated almost 12% of  its total expenditures to the health sector in FY
2002, the corresponding figure for Kilosa was only 4.9%. However, in Kilosa’s case the low
allocation to health may be due to a relatively high allocation (19.4%) in the previous fiscal
year. On average, the allocation to the health sector in 2002 is around 10% of  total expenditures.
Table 9: Health expenditures in % of  total expenditures 
Council FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002
Bagamoyo DC  n.a. 8.2 11.8
Ilala MC 13.3 10.7 11.8
Iringa DC 5.7 7.2 8.1
Kilosa DC 9.8 19.4 4.9
Moshi DC 10.2 11.0 8.9
Mwanza CC 12.7 12.5 8.8
Source: Compiled by the authors basing on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
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3 METHODS OF REVENUE COLLECTION
Local government tax collection is the responsibility of  the council, and is completely
separated from the central government.  In district councils it is organised around three
levels, namely the council headquarters, the wards and the village levels. In urban councils
collection is organised by the two upper levels. At the council headquarters the responsibility
for tax collection rests with the council treasury, headed by the Treasurer. At the ward levels,
the responsibility rests with the office of  the ward executive officer (WEO). The WEO also
handles developmental issues and law-and-order functions at that level. For this purpose
the local militia is at their disposal. In wards with greater revenue potential there will also be
a ward revenue collector (WRC) to support the WEO. At the village level, the responsibility
rests with the office of  the village executive officer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for
supervising village developmental activities and maintaining law and order. In addition, the
VEOs often function as secretaries of  the village council.
In practice, organisation of  tax collection varies between councils. For instance, in some
councils the village level has been excluded from collection, which has been taken over by
the ward level. This is partly due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the
village level that arises from the VEOs operating within their areas of  domicile. Lack of
arm’s-length relationship between tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of
affection into village tax collection. In many villages, before the abolishment of  development
levy in June 2003, local politicians often resisted to mobilise people to pay taxes due to the
unpopularity of taxation.
Most case councils have introduced new methods to increase revenues from existing sources
by outsourcing some of  the revenue collection to private collectors to increase revenues
from existing sources (see Table 10). Only in Iringa DC all own revenues are collected by
the council staff.
Most taxes are paid in cash. One exception, before June 2003, was that civil servants had
their head tax (‘development levy’) withheld from their salaries.5 For the others, development
levy was paid during office hours at any of  the revenue collecting centres mentioned above.
The statutory voluntary period was from January 1 up to September 30. All tax payments
made after the deadline were subject to a penalty equivalent to 50 per cent of  the tax rate. As
from October 1 to December 31 development levy payment ‘campaigns’ were conducted,
organised by the ward office and using state organs, i.e., the local militia and judiciary, to
ensure compliance. Until the use of  force in tax collection was banned by the central
government in 2002, tax defaulters were visited in their homes and people were often required
to show tax receipts at roadblocks. Manned barriers were also used to control buyers of
certain crops like cashew nuts in the Coastal Region. The buyer had to produce receipts
before they were allowed to transport the purchase outside the district. Similar checkpoints
were used to control people for ‘development levy’ and bicycle tax. Roadblocks were
5 See Fjeldstad & Semboja (2000) and Fjeldstad (2003) for further details on local government
taxation and tax administration during the period 1995 - 2002.
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sometimes also used to collect market fees, implying that the fees had to be paid before the
goods entered the market place.
Market fees and crop cesses are, in general, collected at the selling points and markets.
However, ‘big buyers’ of  cessable goods (often co-operatives) are expected to pay directly
to the council treasury. The buyer then pays the council in advance based on an estimate
calculated by the co-operative officer from Ministry of  Agriculture. If  the figures are not
accepted by the ‘big buyer’, negotiations are opened. Most licences and some fees have to
be paid at the respective offices at the council headquarters. Licences are often issued on an
annual or biannual basis. The council may carry out spot-checks of  entrepreneurs and
businesses to control that licences are paid.
Table 10: Modes of  revenue collection (by September 2003)
Council Revenue sources collected by private agents
Bagamoyo DC - Forest levy
- Bus stand  fee
- Sand mines levy
- Hotel levy
- Murram and aggregates
Ilala MC - Public toilets
- Billboard fees
- Market fees (some were outsourced in February 2003)
- Property tax (partly outsourced in June 2003)
Iringa DC (All revenue sources are collected by the council itself)
Kilosa DC - Market fees (in some of  the major markets until August
  2003. Then the contracts with the private collectors were
  abolished since they were not able to fulfil their contracts,
  and the collection is again carried out by council staff).
- Livestock fees (until June 2003 when livestock cess were
  abolished)
- Forest levies (plans are underway to outsource collection)
Moshi DC - Development levy (abolished in June 2003)
- Some market fees
- Business Licenses
Mwanza CC - Produce cess
- Livestock auction fees
- Fish market levy
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the councils’ treasury departments.
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One consequence of  the local revenue system that was in place until the rationalisation in
2003 was high costs of  tax administration.6 Recent estimates of  the administrative costs are
not available. However, Fjeldstad & Semboja (2000) found that in Kilosa DC the wage bill
represented about 80% of  total own revenues reported in 1995.7 The corresponding figure
for 1996 was about 64%. The costs of  tax enforcement also vary between different revenue
sources. Some revenues are relatively less costly to administer because there are clear methods
to deal with defaulters. For instance, water services may be disconnected if  the user fails to
pay the water fees. Similarly a licence may be withdrawn if  business people fail to pay a
licence fee. Many taxes are, however, relatively difficult to collect. Until 2003, revenue
collectors at ward and village levels in the four rural case councils (Bagamoyo DC, Iringa
DC, Kilosa DC and Moshi DC) considered development levy to be the most problematic
tax to collect, followed by crop cess and livestock cess. Tax officials at the district headquarters
also ranked development levy as the most problematic one, followed by property and land
taxes.8 The many sub-bases with different rate structures add to the administrative cost,
although the tax rationalisation carried out in 2003 has most likely reduced these costs.
However, these administrative costs are largely unrecognised by local authorities. Qualitative
data from the six case councils indicate that there is little appreciation of  the opportunity
costs of  the staff  already employed by the council. One might even argue that for certain
small taxes and charges the collection costs seem to be the reason for the levy. In other
words, the purpose is to create employment or at least an income-earning opportunity for
someone who might otherwise be unemployed. Furthermore, the way in which budgets are
compiled, whereby tax revenues appear under one heading and the costs of  the local revenue
office under another, does not encourage cost-effectiveness. In addition, many costs are
simply not made explicit, for instance the use of  government owned buildings, or the use
of  co-operative officers to collect certain taxes.
One major administrative problem today for the case councils is their inability to collect
fully the revenue due to them (Fjeldstad, 2003). In most councils there are huge gaps between
reported and projected revenues. Recent studies conclude that this is due to: (1) poor
administrative capacity to assess the revenue base; (2) poor administrative capacity to enforce
the taxes; (3) explicit and intentional tax evasion and resistance from taxpayers; (4) corruption,
including embezzlement of  revenues; (5) external pressure on the local finance department
to provide optimistic projections; and (6) political pressure on the local tax administration
to relax on revenue collection.
6 In comparison, the administrative costs of  the central government ‘Tanzania Revenue Authority’ constitute
approximately 3 per cent of  gross revenues reported.
7 The wage Bill includes wages and allowances for the staff  of  the revenue department and the ward offices,
including village executive officers.
8 The experiences of  local government tax officials with respect to propety taxes diverge significantly from the
recommendations made by consultants involved in the on-going reform process in Tanzania.
PriceWaterHouse (1998), for instance, recommends the local authorities to use ‘more easily collectible taxes,
such as property taxes’.
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4 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Sound financial management systems are powerful instruments for preventing, discovering,
or facilitating the punishment of  fraud and corruption. Important elements include the
organisation and staffing of  the local revenue administration, the effectiveness of  the auditing
systems and the realism of  budgets (Langlois et al. 1998). Hence, budget reform has become
an important element of  public sector reform, which in turn incorporates elements of  skills
building and institutional strengthening.
4.1 Organisation and staffing of  the Treasury departments
Table 11 shows the staffing situation in the Treasury Department and in the Internal Auditor’s
Office in the case councils as per September 2003. The staffing situation differs substantially
both with respect to numbers and qualifications between the councils. This partly reflects
the size of  the councils. For instance, Ilala MC has 95 and Mwanza CC has 42 staff members
in the Treasury Department, compared to 17 in the Treasury Departments in Bagamoyo
and Moshi DC. To some extent it also reflects that some councils are more attractive to
work in compared to others, for instance Ilala MC versus Iringa DC. However, a general
picture from the Treasury Departments, except for Ilala MC and Mwanza CC is that less
than one third of  the staff members are trained accountants. In Moshi DC, only 2 out of  17
staff members are trained accountants. The remaining majority of  staff  has either no formal
training in accounting or only hold certificates.
Table 11: Staffing of  the Treasury Department and the Internal Auditor’s office
(September 2003)
Council Treasury Department Internal Auditor’s Office
Total No. of Training/ Total No. of Training/
Staff Trained Workshop Staff Trained Workshop/
Accountants /Courses Auditors Courses
Bagamoyo DC 17 5 - 0 0 -
Ilala MC 95 35 - 4 4 1
Iringa DC 15 3 - 1 1 -
Kilosa DC 23 7 6 1 1 1
Moshi DC 17 2 - 1 1 1
Mwanza CC 42 14 - 1 1 -
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the councils’ management teams.
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4.2 Organisation and staffing of  the Internal Auditor’s office
The Internal Auditor’s Office in the case councils are either weakly staffed or not staffed at
all (see Table 11 above). Bagamoyo, for instance, has no internal auditor in place, and in
Iringa DC this position was vacant until mid-2003. Hence, until recently the internal auditing
in Iringa DC was carried out by the Treasury staff  themselves, which has undermined the
credibility of  the auditing process.
A general problem experienced in the case councils is that many internal auditors after
having acquired some experience in the local authorities quit for the private sector where
they are offered substantially higher salaries. Vacancies in both urban and rural councils are
often difficult to fill. Lack of  response by the Treasury Department (or other departments)
on internal audit queries and recommendations also contribute to discourage auditors to
stay in councils.
4.3 Computerisation of  the Treasury departments
Budgeting and accounting are still carried out manually in all the six case councils (by
September 2003). Only Kilosa applies in practice PLATINUM in combination with a manual
system (see Table 12). Ilala MC has started to implement PLATINUM and Epicor is in
place in Mwanza CC. In contrast, Bagamoyo, Iringa and Moshi have not yet started to
computerise financial management and planning.
Table 12: Computerisation of  the Treasury Departments (by September 2003)
Council Computerisation
Bagamoyo DC No – budgeting and accounting are carried out manually
Ilala MC Started to use PLATINUM. Experienced problems to
implement the system at lower levels of  the council.
Hence, the manual system is still used.
Iringa DC No - use a manual system
Kilosa DC Use both PLATINUM and the Manual system
Moshi DC Not started to implementing neither PLATINUM nor
Epicor system
Mwanza CC Epicor is introduced, but the manual system is still used
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the councils’ treasury departments
18
Fjeldstad, Henjewele, Mwambe, Ngalewa and Nygaard
4.4 Audit queries
According to the annual report 2002 on the state of  corruption in Tanzania, corruption in
local authorities is particularly prevalent in procurement of  goods and services, in revenue
collection and financial management, in human resources management, and in land allocation
and control (e.g., ESRF & FACEIT, 2002). Although some officials, including the internal
auditors, may raise concern on procurement and tendering cases, such issues are in general
difficult to discuss openly with the management teams and councillors. In general, only
cases where individuals are suspended or under investigation for taking bribes are mentioned,
but then usually not as an institutional or systemic failure, but as a moral issue. This contrasts
the views of  ordinary citizens who in interviews often refer to corruption as a serious
problem in local authorities (see section 6).
4.4.1 Internal auditing
Table 13 provides an overview of  some queries on tendering procedures in the case councils.
Interestingly, Bagamoyo DC, which has no internal auditor, and Iringa DC, which was without
one until mid-2003, reported that there were no irregularities in tendering and procurement.9 In
contrast, the internal auditors in Kilosa DC and Mwanza CC had made queries on such problems.
However, many reports by the internal auditors in the case councils are not responded to or no
action is taken by the council. For example in Kilosa DC, the Internal Auditor’s report for FY
2000 shows that none of  the internal auditor’s recommendations were followed up by the
council. Such lack of  response indicates that the internal audit reports are considered to be less
serious and less ‘powerful’ than the external Auditor General’s reports.
9 Iringa DC recruited a new internal auditor in mid-2003.
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Table 13: Examples of  queries on tendering procedures (by September 2003)
Council Tendering procedures
Bagamoyo DC According to the DMT, there are no complains on the tendering
procedures. The council follows the tendering procedure as
prescribed by the LG Financial Memorandum.
Ilala MC Irregularities in tendering procedures were revealed in 2002 and
eight staff members were suspended.
Iringa DC According to the DMT, so far no problems in procurement.
DANIDA has organised training on new tendering procedures.
Kilosa DC In 2002, irregularities were reported in tendering and a contradic
tion over Gairo-Nongwe road construction. There was a disagree
ment between the DMT and the councillors on who should get
the contract. The contractor proved to be unqualified and the
work was below standard and incomplete.
Moshi DC According to the DT as a Secretary to tender board, tendering
system is done with caution taking into account Financial Memo
randum, to avoid conflicts of  interest between staff  and council-
lors and more precisely councillors representing different parties.
Mwanza CC According to the CCMT, they follow Financial Memorandum.
However, the awarding of  contracts does not follow professional
standards.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the councils’ management teams
4.4.2 External auditing
Missing receipts and payments (including unauthorised payments) for equipment, stationeries
etc., without supporting documents were raised as concerns in the Auditor General’s reports
from all the case councils.10 In particular, missing revenue earning receipt books is reported
as a problem. For instance, in 2000 Iringa DC did not present 828 receipt books totalling
TSh 80,955,000 for audit. Moreover, in several of  the case councils revenue reported as
paid by cheques in the final accounts were not recorded at the councils’ bank accounts. In
Iringa DC, for example, the unaccounted cheques amounted to TSh 14,718,079 in 2000,
and Ilala MC was paid TSh 1,203,829 which, until October 2002, appear as ‘dishonoured’
cheques.
The most recent report from the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) shows, however,
that more councils than before have got a ‘clean’ statement on their accounts. This applies
to Ilala MC, Kilosa DC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC, which all received clean reports in
10 This does not apply to Moshi DC for which we had not received information on audited reports
by the time of  publishing this study.
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2001 (see table 14). But it is too early to state whether this is a trend or only accidental.
Moreover, to our knowledge the quality of  the CAG’s reports on local authorities has not
been evaluated. Thus, one should be cautious to draw any conclusions based on the CAG’s
findings. However, preliminary observations from the case councils, which need to be
substantiated by further research, indicate that no significant improvements have taken
place in recent years to curb corruption in local authorities, with a possible exception for
Kilosa DC, which seems to have experienced positive changes since mid-2002. Furthermore,
with respect to the quality of  financial management our research cannot, at this stage, identify
any differences between the case councils that were part of  the initial LGRP phase 1 and
those which were not.
As noted above, we find some indications that financial management has improved in Kilosa
DC since mid-2002. The new DED has put much effort into making the District Treasurer’s
office complying with the Financial Regulations. She is also following up inquires made by
the Internal Auditor, which until 2002 seemed to have been ignored by the then District
Treasurer. Hence, it is surprising that Kilosa DC got a clean report from the CAG in 2001,
when the present management team considers the accounts and financial reporting to be
very weak. Moreover, according to the Internal Auditor in Kilosa, many queries in 2001
were not followed up by the then council treasurer.
Table 14: Audit Report of  the Controller and Auditor General for the Six Councils,
2000-2002
Council 2000 2001
Bagamoyo DC Adverse Adverse
Ilala MC Qualified Clean
Iringa DC Adverse Adverse
Kilosa DC Adverse Clean
Moshi DC Adverse Clean
Mwanza CC Qualified Clean
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the Controller and Auditor General
(CAG)
4.5 Budgets and accounts
Gaps between budgets and accounts provide an indication of  the quality and realism of
budgeting in the case councils. Moreover, whether gender budgeting is introduced or not is
an indicator of  to what extent the council treasury follows the financial regulations given by
the central government.
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4.5.1 Gap between budgeted and accounted revenues
Table 15 shows the gaps between accounted revenues and the corresponding budget estimates
in the three year period 2000-2002. In Ilala MC and Bagamoyo DC, the revenue estimates in
all three years were within a 10% range of  the reported revenues. For the four other councils,
the gaps between accounts and budgets in 2002 were between 13% (Kilosa) and 35% (Iringa).
No trend can be derived from the table, as the gaps between reported and projected revenues
vary from year to year in all councils. For some councils, and in particular Moshi DC, the
annual fluctuations are substantial and may reflect weak budgeting.
Table 15: Accounted own revenues in % of  budget estimates
Council 2000 2001 2002
Bagamoyo DC 93.9 109.2 91.3
Ilala MC 102.5 101.1 95.5
Iringa DC 62.2 57.4 65.8
Kilosa DC 83.3 91.0 87.6
Moshi DC 43.7 82.4 67.3
Mwanza CC 95.4 91.5 75.4
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the councils’ ‘Abstracts of  Final Accounts’.
4.5.2 Gender budgeting
All six case councils are in principle earmarking parts of  their budgets for ‘women and
youth development’. This is based on the 1997 directive from the central government to
establish revolving ‘Women and Youths Development Funds’, to which the councils shall
contribute 10% of  total revenues. Ilala MC, Iringa DC, Kilosa DC and Mwanza CC report
that they allocate 10% of  own revenues to this fund (see Table 16). Moshi DC, however,
reports that less than 10% of  its own generated revenues go to women and youths due to
political interference. Bagamoyo DC does not have special allocation to women and youths
from own sources, but refers to receive money for such purposes from the central
government. These factors, combined with problems of making beneficiaries repay the
loans received, raise concern for the sustainability of  the ‘revolving’ women and youth
funds. Hence, Mwanza CC and Ilala MC report that they also have put in place other measures
to support women setting up businesses, including funds from the Ministry of  Community
Development, Gender and Children.
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Table 16: Gender and youth budgeting (by September 2003)
Council From the Central Govt From own sources From others
Bagamoyo DC (i) PO-RALG: Loans to
women groups; the minimum
is 50,000 - 250,000/-
(ii) Ministry of  Community
Development, Gender and
Children: 4m/- were issued
for loans to women and youth
groups in 2002
Ilala MC (i)  Min of  CDW&C: Loans 10% of  the council’s
granted to women and yoyuth revenue collection goes
groups. 21 groups had repaid to Women and Youth
their loans in 2002 Development Funds
Iringa DC (i) 10% of  the council’s
revenue collection goes
to Women and Youths
Development Funds
(ii) Ward banks are
established
Kilosa DC 10% of  the council’s
revenue collection goes
to Women and Youths
Development Funds
Moshi DC Less than 10% of the
council’s revenue
collection goes to
Women and Youths
Development Funds.
According to
 information from the
DC, this is partly due to
political interventions in
council affairs
Mwanza CC Ministry of  CDW&Y: Loans 10% of  the to council’s DANIDA and
to women and youth groups revenue collection goes Plan International
women and youth to Women and Youth
groups Development
Funds
Source: Compiled by the authors based on information from the councils’ management teams
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5 TRANSPARENCY IN FINANCIAL AND FISCAL AFFAIRS
The case councils use different ways of  disseminating information on fiscal affairs (i.e.
revenues and expenditures) to the public. All councils reported that such information was
disseminated through meetings organised by the councils, including full council meetings,
ward and village meetings (Table 17). Ilala MC, Kilosa DC and Mwanza CC also reported
that they used newspapers to disseminate this information. Notice boards at ward and
council headquarters were also used in Ilala MC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC.
Table 17: Dissemination of  information on fiscal issues to the public from the
councils (by September 2003)
Council Modes of  dissemination of  fiscal information (revenues and
expenditures)
Bagamoyo - Information on revenue collection disseminated through council meetings
Ilala MC - People invited into quarterly reports presentations during full council
- Through notice boards at ward offices
- Through WDC meetings
- Through newspapers
Iringa DC - Through village assemblies
- Through village meetings
Kilosa DC - Through village and wards meetings
- Through full council meetings
- Through newspapers
Moshi DC - Through ward councils and village assemblies
- Through notice boards at council Headquarters
- Every month the WEOs are called at council Headquarters to be informed
and directed to put fiscal information on notice boards at ward offices.
Mwanza CC - Through full council meetings
- Published on notice boards
- Published in the newspapers
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
The Citizens’ survey provides some details on the effectiveness of  these mechanisms used
by the councils to disseminate information, and whether such information actually reaches
the public.11 The situation was found to be quite gloomy with respect to information on
local government revenues, while information on HIV/AIDS seemed to reach the public.
11 The citizens’ survey was conducted in October 2003. It covered 42 wards in the six case
councils and 1260 respondents in total.
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Few of  the respondents (5.6%) had seen any posted information about local government
finances (Table 18). However, there were differences between those respondents who said
they had heard about the LGR (8.9%) and those who answer they have not (2.6%). In
contrast, the large majority (77.5% of  the respondents) have seen posters for HIV/AIDS.
Respondents who have heard about the local government reform (LGR) were relatively
more likely to have received or seen information on all the issues given. This tendency was
particularly evident with regard to information on how to report corruption, where 23% of
those who had heard about LGR relative to 10% of  those who had not heard about LGR
had received this information. Moreover, when asked where they got information on various
government policies, such as tax policy, HIV/AIDS control policy, health policy, education
policy, the local government reform etc, radio was by far the media the majority of  the
respondents referred to. Newspapers and other forms of  information dissemination used
by the local authorities seemed to play a minor role.
Table 18: Citizens’ perceptions on information received on particular issues
Have you in the past two years seen any of  the following
information posted in a public place?
LG Taxes and Audited Financial HIV/AIDS How to
budget fees statements allocation prevention report
collected of counsil to sectors corruption
expenditure
Description Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Heard 10.6 89.4 8.9 91.1 4.0 96.0 7.4 92.6 84.5 15.5 23.4 76.6
Not 3.0 97.0 2.6 97.4 1.2 98.8 1.8 98.2 71.2 28.8 9.9 90.1
Total 6.6 93.4 5.6 94.4 2.5 97.5 4.4 95.6 77.5 22.5 16.3 83.7
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
From Table 19, we see that 86% of  all respondents said they had never received information
on how much tax revenue and user charges that had been collected in area. There were,
however, large variations across councils with respect to information on tax revenues
collected. The respondents in Kilosa DC and Iringa DC appeared to be better informed
than people in the other councils. While 33.3% of  the respondents in Kilosa and 20.5% in
Iringa said they had received information on tax revenues collected in their area, only 5.7%
of  the respondents in Ilala MC and Mwanza CC said they were informed. This did not
imply that such information had not been disseminated in Ilala and Mwanza, but that the
information either had been disseminated in a way which did not reach the general public or
in a form which was not easily accessible for ordinary citizens.
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Table 19: Information received on tax revenues collected in the area (% of  the
respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
No information received 94.3 93.3 66.7 79.5 88.6 94.3 86.1
Infor- Village chair-
mation person/leader - 0.5 10.5 5.2 1.4 2.4 3.3
received Village execu-
from: tive officer - 2.4 18.6 12.9 0.5 1.0 5.9
Ward executive
officer 4.8 2.4 3.8 1.4 - 1.0 2.2
Council staff 0.5 1.0 0.5 - - - 0.3
The ward
councillor - 0.5 - 0.5 0.5 0.2
Others 0.5 - - 1.0 9.0 1.0 1.9
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
The survey data do not provide us with a clear answer as to why the respondents in the two
urban councils append to be more ignorant on this issue than people living in rural councils.
However, among those who said they had received information on tax revenues, the Village
Executive Officers (VEOs) were in general the most likely institution to have issued it. This
may indicate that the VEOs in some contexts may function as a good channel of  information
between the council and citizens, and that some councils use this channel more effectively
than others. Our research results show that Kilosa DC, and to some extent also Iringa DC,
use village and ward meetings actively as a way of  disseminating such information orally to
the public. For instance, Kilosa has introduced a system where information from the village
accounts on revenues and expenditures was presented orally at the quarterly Village Assembly
meetings. According to people interviewed, this has also led to much higher attendance at
these meetings. The experiences from Kilosa and Iringa may, thus, provide useful lessons
for other councils. It also matters that these two councils have longer experience with bottom-
up and participatory planning approaches than many other local authorities due to the
involvement of  foreign donors over a relatively long period of  time (Ireland Aid in Kilosa
and Danida in Iringa).
The citizens’ survey was conducted about 4 months after the substantial rationalisation of
local government taxes, including the abolition of  development levy. As Table 20 shows,
there are large variations across councils with regard to awareness of  these recent changes
of  the local tax system. In Kilosa DC only 12% had not heard of  the changes, while the
corresponding figure for Mwanza CC was more than 73%. Of  the respondents who had
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heard of  the amendments of  the local tax system, the majority were not, however, able to
specify of  what kind these changes were.
Table 20: Awareness of  recent changes of  the local tax system (by October 2003,
in % of  the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Not heard of recent
changes to LG tax  67.6 66.2 12.4 26.2 70.5 73.3 52.7
Have Abolition of de-
heard of velopment levy 2.9 6.2 37.6 22.9 4.3 5.2 13.2
recent Abolition of
changes nuisance taxes - 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.4 0.5 1.3
to LG Reduction of
tax some tax rates 1.0 - - 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Abolition of
all taxes 2.9 1.9 4.8 11.0 1.9 2.9 4.2
Abolition of
local govt taxes - - - 2.4 - - 0.4
Abolition of
tax for small
businesses - - - 2.9 1.0 - 0.6
Abolition of
crop/animal taxes - - 0.5 1.4 - - 0.3
Abolition of
property taxes 0.5 - 0.5 - - 0.5 0.2
Some people
(Women)
exempted - - 0.5 - - - 0.1
Did not specify 25.2 24.3 42.4 29.0 20.5 17.1 26.4
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
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6 TAX COMPLIANCE AND FISCAL CORRUPTION
In all the case councils, taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay taxes and fees was reported as a
major obstacle to enhancing local government revenues. This has also been documented in
studies from other councils across Tanzania in recent years (e.g., Fjeldstad & Semboja,
2000, 2001). The Citizens’ Survey provides some indications on the factors that impact on
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.
Table 21 shows the percentages of  all respondents, by council and in total, that agree, agree
partly (50-50) or disagree to whether given issues are major problems in tax collection.
Other respondents either did not know or they had no view. Only 28.6% of  the respondents
see taxpayer unwillingness to be a problem. In contrast, too high taxes (47.9% of  the
respondents) and dishonest tax collectors (45.7%) are perceived to be major problems.
However, the issue a majority of  the respondents (58.4%) perceived to be the most serious
problem for tax collection, was that the money collected was not spent on public services.
Table 21: Major problems in local tax collection (% of  the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Tax revenue not Agree 62.9 65.2 48.1 44.8 68.1 61.4 58.4
being spent on 50-50 13.3 11.9 18.1 26.2 5.2 9.0 14.0
public services Disagree 14.3 10.0 13.8 12.4 7.6 11.9 11.7
Too high tax/ Agree 51.9 51.9 46.2 30.5 52.9 53.8 47.9
fee rates 50-50 12.9 17.1 11.4 29.0 10.5 11.9 15.5
Disagree 14.8 14.8 25.2 21.4 17.1 18.6 18.7
Dishonest Agree 53.8 51.4 40.0 33.3 49.5 46.2 45.7
collectors 50-50 20.0 16.2 14.3 30.5 12.4 17.6 18.5
Disagree 14.3 17.6 22.9 17.1 13.8 11.9 16.3
Too many Agree 50.5 44.3 28.6 23.3 41.4 45.2 38.9
taxes/fees 50-50 15.2 16.2 13.3 26.7 14.3 13.3 16.5
Disagree 16.7 20.5 40.5 28.1 25.2 22.9 25.6
Harassment by Agree 43.3 36.2 33.3 29.0 41.0 46.2 38.2
tax collectors 50-50 20.0 21.4 20.0 23.3 21.0 21.0 21.1
Disagree 23.8 27.6 29.5 30.5 16.7 9.5 22.9
Table continues on next page
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Description Ilala  Bagamoyo  Kilosa Iringa  Moshi   Mwanza Total
  Tax payers’ Agree 31.0 28.1 22.9 31.4 30.0 28.1 28.6
unwillingness to 50-50 19.0 21.0 22.9 17.6 15.7 21.0 19.5
pay taxes Disagree 35.7 36.7 39.5 36.7 36.7 34.8 36.7
Dishonest local Agree 21.0 17.1 29.5 21.0 28.1 23.3 23.3
government 50-50 23.8 24.8 13.8 23.3 28.6 24.3 23.1
elected leaders Disagree 39.0 38.1 38.6 35.2 15.7 24.3 31.8
Dishonest Agree 15.7 11.9 12.4 11.0 22.4 15.7 14.8
Parliamentarians 50-50 15.7 17.6 10.0 15.2 19.5 19.0 16.2
Disagree 49.5 44.8 50.0 48.6 19.0 33.3 40.9
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
Taxes are widely perceived to be unfair. The respondents see few tangible benefits in return
for the taxes they pay. This situation heightens taxpayers’ perceptions of  exploitation from
an unequal contract with government, and may promote tax resistance. Although most
taxpayers are unable to assess the exact value of  what they receive from the government in
return for taxes paid, it can be argued that they have general impressions concerning their
terms of  trade with the government. In this context, it can be assumed that taxpayers’
behaviour is influenced by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the terms of  trade with
government. Thus, if  the system of  taxes is perceived to be unjust, tax resistance may be
considered as an attempt by the taxpayers to adjust their terms of  trade with the government.
Only 9% of  all respondents agreed to the fact that most of  the tax revenues collected in
area were used for reciprocal services (Table 22). Second, the majority of  all respondents
(51%) held the view that people should deny paying taxes until services were improved.
Thirdly, 73% of  all respondents agreed to increased taxation in exchange of  improved
services. The respondents in Iringa DC were least inclined to willingly increase tax payments
in exchange for further service improvements. Surprisingly, given the stronghold of  the
opposition parties, respondents in Moshi DC were the most positive to this hypothetical
question. Fourthly, about two-third of  all respondents agreed to more citizen participation
to improved social services, though there were large variations across councils.
Table: continued from previous page
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Table 22: Views on tax collection and reciprocal services (% of  the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Are tax revenues Yes, mostly 9.0 9.5 2.4 11.0 9.5 12.9 9.0
collected in the Partly 23.3 23.8 14.3 21.0 15.7 22.9 20.2
area used to Not at all 33.8 31.9 49.5 32.4 38.1 32.9 364
Provide public Don’t know 33.8 34.8 33.8 35.7 36.7 31.4 34.4
service?
Should people Agree 51.4 49.0 39.5 35.2 66.2 64.3 51.0
deny paying Partly 6.2 8.1 8.1 9.0 9.0 6.7 7.9
taxes until they Disagree 38.1 35.2 47.6 48.1 18.6 24.3 35.3
get better Don’t know 4.3 7.6 4.8 7.6 6.2 4.8 5.9
services?
Willing to pay Yes 72.9 65.7 72.9 59.0 82.4 83.3 72.7
more taxes if No 25.7 28.6 25.2 37.6 14.3 11.4 23.8
public services Don’t know 1.4 5.7 1.9 3.3 3.3 5.2 3.5
improved?
Should people Agree 56.2 70.0 90.5 92.9 69.0 71.0 74.9
contribute to Partly 13.8 5.7 3.8 3.3 12.4 13.3 8.7
better social Disagree 29.5 18.1 4.8 2.4 14.8 11.4 13.5
services Don’t know 0.5 6.2 1.0 1.4 3.8 4.3 2.9
through more
self-help
activities?
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
Almost 50 % of  the respondents were of  the opinion that people would evade taxes if  they
could get away with it (Table 23). However, we observed some differences between the case
councils. While 59% of  the respondents in Moshi DC answered that they believed most
taxpayers would evade if  they thought they could get away with it, the corresponding figure
for Kilosa DC was 38.6%. The most cited reason for tax compliance (46%), on the other
side, was that people pay because they ‘would avoid disturbances’. Only 22.6% of  the
respondents said that they believed people paid because they anticipated for improved public
services.
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Table 23: Views on tax evasion and reasons for compliance (% of  the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza Total
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC
Would tax Agree 48.6 48.6 38.6 37.1 59.0 58.1 48.3
payers evade 50-50 9.5 11.0 10.5 10.0 7.6 9.5 9.7
taxation if Disagree 34.3 32.4 48.1 43.8 25.7 26.7 35.2
possible Don’t know 7.6 8.1 2.9 9.0 7.6 5.7 6.8
Major They have no
reasons opportunity
why to evade 13.3 10.0 6.2 10.0 13.3 6.7 9.9
people They anticipate
pay public services 25.7 22.9 20.0 18.6 23.3 25.2 22.6
taxes Feel obligations
towards the
government 11.4 8.1 11.4 12.4 4.8 9.5 9.6
They will avoid
disturbances 38.6 43.3 57.1 53.8 39.0 41.4 45.6
Others 4.3 2.4 0.5 1.9 8.6 5.7 3.9
Don’t know 6.7 13.3 4.8 3.3 11.0 11.4 8.4
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
Corruption was perceived to be a problem in all six case councils (Table 24). However, there
were large differences across councils with regard to the extent of  corruption. In Kilosa
DC, 40% of  the respondents viewed corruption as a serious problem. This compares to
72% in Moshi DC. Kilosa and Moshi also stood out with regard to changes in the level of
corruption during the last two years. In Kilosa, 40% had seen a decline in the level of
corruption, whereas in Moshi 53% had observed an increase. There was agreement across
councils that corruption must be combated at every opportunity.
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Table 24: Perceptions on corruption (% of  the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Is corruption Yes 64.3 61.4 40.0 48.6 71.9 69.5 59.3
a serious Average 12.9 10.0 22.9 16.7 8.1 7.1 12.9
problem in No 14.8 16.7 18.6 21.0 8.1 10.5 14.9
this council? Don’t know 8.1 11.9 18.6 13.8 11.9 12.9 12.9
Level of  cor- Worse 44.8 39.0 28.6 29.5 52.9 40.0 39.1
ruption in the No change 23.8 17.6 7.6 4.8 19.0 19.5 15.4
council com- Less 21.4 28.1 39.5 38.6 12.4 23.8 27.3
pared to 2 Don’t know 10.0 15.2 24.3 27.1 15.7 16.7 18.2
years ago
Is corruption Agree 7.6 8.1 5.7 5.7 3.3 1.0 5.2
a natural occur To some
rence; no need degree 8.6 5.7 6.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 5.1
to denounce Disagree 81.9 80.0 82.4 85.2 90.0 93.8 85.6
it? Don’t know 1.9 6.2 5.7 5.2 3.3 2.4 4.1
Corruption is Agree 94.3 94.3 94.3 93.8 92.4 95.2 94.0
a disease; To some
should be degree 4.3 - 1.9 3.8 1.0 0.5 1.9
denounced in Disagree 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.4 3.8 1.9 2.0
every case? Don’t know 1.0 3.8 1.4 1.0 2.9 2.4 2.1
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
Almost one third (27%) of  all respondents were of  the opinion that misuse of  tax revenues
was unavoidable, though there were large variations across councils (see Table 25). Only
11% of  respondents in Iringa DC thought misuse was unavoidable, compared to as many
as 41% in Moshi DC. In general, respondents favoured village authorities over ward, council
and parliamentarians to truthfully allocate tax revenues. Another interesting observation
was the relative high degree of  trust in the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).
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Table 25: Where and by whom is misuse of  tax revenue least likely (% of  the
respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Where do you Village
think tax authorities 6.7 9.0 32.4 18.1 7.6 16.2 15.0
revenue is Ward office 10.0 3.3 10.0 13.8 8.6 14.8 10.1
least likely to Council
be misused? authorities 8.6 11.4 5.7 20.5 2.9 2.4 8.6
Service
facility 5.7 10.0 8.1 4.3 6.2 7.1 6.9
TRA 13.3 17.6 15.2 11.9 12.9 17.6 14.8
Misuse
unavoidable 38.1 29.0 20.5 11.0 40.5 25.2 27.4
Don’t know 17.6 19.5 8.1 20.5 21.4 16.7 17.3
Who do you Village
think is least authorities 7.1 16.2 18.6 11.9 7.6 17.1 13.1
likely to Ward office 5.7 1.9 7.1 10.5 7.6 14.3 7.9
misuse tax Council
revenue? authorities 2.4 3.3 8.1 9.0 3.3 2.4 4.8
Parliamen-
tarians 2.4 5.2 5.7 7.1 0.5 1.9 3.8
Service
facility 21.9 13.8 17.1 14.3 8.6 7.6 13.9
TRA
collectors 13.3 14.8 16.2 21.0 9.5 10.0 14.1
Don’t know 34.8 31.9 17.1 18.6 49.5 31.9 30.6
Others 12.4 12.9 10.0 7.6 13.3 14.8 11.8
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
Table 26 shows that 64% of  all respondents thought that reporting misuse of  tax revenue
to a journalist would help reduce this form of  corruption. Some respondents did not think
any of  the given measures would impact on the extent of  tax revenue misuse. The most
frequent reason given for this attitude was the view that ‘all civil servants were corrupt and
they protected each other’. This attitude reflected that much was left to be done to build
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trust-relations between the local authorities and citizens. As long as ‘whistle-blowers’ were
not protected, it was likely that most cases of misuse of  revenues by local government
officials would remain unreported.
Table 26: What actions would reduce the misuse of  tax revenues (% of  the re-
spondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Group/Institution MC DC DC DC DC CC Total
Village Yes 43.8 50.0 49.5 64.8 41.0 48.6 49.6
authorities No 45.7 36.2 46.7 30.0 40.0 42.9 40.2
Don’t know 10.5 13.8 3.8 5.2 19.0 8.6 10.2
Ward Yes 38.1 49.5 49.5 57.1 43.3 50.0 47.9
office No 51.9 36.7 45.7 38.1 37.6 41.0 41.8
Don’t know 10.0 13.8 4.8 4.8 19.0 9.0 10.2
Council Yes 36.7 40.5 47.1 53.3 40.5 46.7 44.1
authorities No 53.3 44.8 44.8 40.5 39.0 42.4 44.1
Don’t know 10.0 14.8 8.1 6.2 20.5 11.0 11.7
Police Yes 41.9 39.5 54.8 49.0 42.4 43.8 45.2
No 49.5 48.1 40.0 46.2 39.5 43.8 44.5
Don’t know 8.6 12.4 5.2 4.8 18.1 12.4 10.2
Member Yes 40.0 43.8 40.5 49.0 50.0 62.9 47.7
of  Parliament No 50.0 41.9 52.4 45.2 30.0 27.1 41.1
Don’t know 10.0 14.3 7.1 5.7 20.0 10.0 11.2
Political Yes 42.9 41.4 30.5 38.1 56.2 59.0 44.7
party No 45.7 44.3 58.1 50.0 27.1 28.6 42.3
leaders Don’t know 11.4 14.3 11.4 11.9 16.7 12.4 13.0
Journalist Yes 63.3 60.5 59.5 63.3 67.6 68.1 63.7
No 27.1 25.2 25.7 24.3 15.2 20.5 23.0
Don’t know 9.5 14.3 14.8 12.4 17.1 11.4 13.3
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
34
Fjeldstad, Henjewele, Mwambe, Ngalewa and Nygaard
Table 27 gives the percentage of  all respondents, by council and in total, that agree, agree
partly (50-50) or disagree to whether the given issues would improve the use of  tax revenue.
Other respondents did not know. The most favoured measures were stronger punishment
of  government employees (83% of  the respondents) and politicians (80% of  the
respondents). More information to the public on the allocation of  tax revenues was also
perceived to be a potential important measure to improve the use of  revenues.
Table 27: What actions should be taken to improve the use of  tax revenues (% of
the respondents)
Council Name
Ilala Bagamoyo Kilosa Iringa Moshi Mwanza
Description MC DC DC DC DC DC Total
Stronger punish- Agree 78.1 79.5 89.5 89.0 80.0 83.3 83.3
ment to govern- 50 -50 10.5 11.0 6.2 4.8 9.5 6.7 8.1
ment employees Disagree 8.1 5.2 3.8 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.6
Stronger punish- Agree 67.6 75.2 89.0 86.7 77.1 82.4 79.7
ment to 50 -50 16.7 12.4 7.1 6.7 10.0 7.1 10.0
politicians Disagree 12.4 7.6 3.3 5.7 8.1 6.2 7.2
More information Agree 79.0 75.2 82.9 77.1 74.8 77.1 77.7
on allocation of 50 -50 11.9 10.5 10.0 13.8 13.8 13.3 12.2
tax revenues Disagree 5.2 7.1 6.7 7.1 6.7 4.3 6.2
More information Agree 78.1 69.5 79.5 72.4 71.9 75.2 74.4
on how much re- 50 -50 10.0 11.9 11.9 14.8 15.7 14.8 13.2
venues is collected Disagree 7.6 11.4 8.1 11.4 7.6 4.8 8.5
More involvement Agree 12.9 21.9 24.3 21.4 17.6 16,7 19.1
of police in tax 50 -50 14.8 17.1 10.0 12.4 6.2 5.2 11.0
collection Disagree 66.7 54.3 64.3 64.3 66.2 70.0 64.3
Source: Citizens Survey (FPR, 2003a).
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7 CONCLUSIONS
The report analyses data on finances and financial management in six councils over the
period of  2000-2003. The analysis focuses on the following key issues: (i) the degree of
fiscal autonomy; (ii) financial management, including budgeting, accounting and auditing;
(iii) methods of  revenue collection; (iv) transparency in fiscal and financial affairs; and (v)
tax compliance and fiscal corruption.
7.1 Summary
(i) Fiscal autonomy is limited in district councils both with respect to revenues and
expenditures. The bulk of  their revenues (80-90%) are conditional grants from the
central government. In contrast, the urban councils are less dependent on transfers
from above, and generate a substantial share of  revenues from own sources. In 2002,
Ilala MC generated about 64% of  its revenue through own sources and Mwanza CC
almost 48%. However, none of  the six case councils have experienced an increase in
own revenues’ share of  total revenues during the three year period 1999-2002. In
Bagamoyo, Iringa, and Mwanza, there is a clear downward trend in own revenues as
a percentage of  total revenues.
(ii) Most case councils have introduced new methods to increase revenues from existing
sources by outsourcing some of  the revenue collection to private collectors to increase
revenues from existing sources. Only in Iringa DC are all own revenues collected by
the council staff.
(iii) With respect to the quality of  financial management our research cannot, at this
stage, identify any differences between the case councils that were part of  the initial
LGRP phase 1 and those which were not. Gaps between budgets and accounts provide
an indication of  the quality and realism of  budgeting in the case councils. No trend
can be derived from the data, as the gaps between reported and projected revenues
vary from year to year in all councils. For some councils, and in particular Moshi DC,
the annual fluctuations are substantial and reflect weak budgeting. Moreover, the
staffing situation in the case councils’ treasury departments differs both with respect
to the number of  staff members and their qualifications. The findings show that
urban councils are better staffed than the rural ones. However, a general picture from
the Treasury Departments is that about one third or less of  the staff  are trained
accountants. The remaining majority of  staff  have either no formal training in
accounting or only hold certificates. Furthermore, while more councils than before
have got a ‘clean’ statement on their accounts from the Controller and Auditor General
(this applies to Ilala MC, Kilosa DC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC, which all received
clean reports in 2001), it is too early to state whether this is the trend or only something
accidental. Hence, one should be cautious to draw conclusions on this basis.
(iv) There are reasons to question the effectiveness of  the mechanisms used by the
councils to disseminate information on financial and fiscal affairs to the public, and
whether such information actually reaches the public. Very few of  the respondents
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(5.6%) in the citizens’ survey, which covered 1260 respondents in the case councils,
said they had seen any information about local government finances. 86% of  all
respondents say they have never received information on the amount of  tax revenues
and user charges collected in area. There were, however, large variations across councils.
The respondents in Kilosa DC appear to be relatively best informed, whereas the
highest levels of  ignorance among citizens with regard to tax collection were found
in the urban councils of  Ilala MC and Mwanza CC.
(v) In all the case councils, taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay taxes and fees was reported as
a major obstacle to enhancing local government revenues. The most serious problem
perceived by a majority of  the respondents (58.4%) in the citizens’ survey was that
the money collected was not spent on public services. With respect to the urban-
rural divide which was observed on other issues, the respondents in Ilala MC and
Mwanza CC reported that too many taxes/fees and harassment by tax collectors
were bigger problems compared to what was reported by the respondents in the
rural councils. However, dissatisfaction on poor linkages between taxes paid and
service delivery showed no rural-urban divide. In general, taxes were widely perceived
to be unfair. Only 9% of  the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘most of
the tax revenues collected in the area was used for reciprocal services’. The most
cited reason for tax compliance (46%), on the other side, was that people paid because
they ‘would avoid disturbances’. Interestingly, 73% of  the respondents said they would
be willing to pay more taxes in exchange for improved services. Corruption was also
perceived to be a problem in all the six case councils. However, there were large
differences across councils with respect to the extent of  corruption. In Kilosa DC,
40% of  the respondents viewed corruption as a serious problem, compared to 72%
in Moshi DC. Moreover, in Kilosa 40% have seen a decline in the level of  corruption
during the last two years, whereas in Moshi 53% had observed an increase. There was
agreement across councils that corruption must be combated at every opportunity,
but many respondents thought that no measures would impact on the extent of  tax
revenue misuse. The most frequent reason given for this attitude was the view that
‘all civil servants were corrupt and they protected each other’. This attitude reflected
that much was left to be done to build trust-relations between the local authorities
and citizens.
7.2 Implications for policy
One major administrative problem today for many councils is their inability to collect fully
the revenue due to them. In most councils there are huge gaps between reported and projected
revenues. This is due to: (1) poor administrative capacity to assess the revenue base; (2) poor
administrative capacity to enforce the taxes; (3) explicit and intentional tax evasion and
resistance from taxpayers; (4) corruption, including embezzlement of  revenues; (5) external
pressure on the local finance department to provide optimistic projections; and (6) political
pressure on the local tax administration to relax on revenue collection. In this setting,
fundamental issues to be addressed in the context of  local government fiscal reforms include
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to redesign the current revenue structure and to strengthen financial management. Moreover,
measures are required to enhance taxpayers’ compliance and to improve the accountability
of  tax collectors and councillors. This cannot be achieved without substantial and consistent
political support from the central government.
A fundamental requirement when further redesigning the local tax system is greater emphasis
on the cost-effectiveness of  revenue collection, taking into account not only the direct costs
of  tax administration, but also the overall costs to the economy, including the compliance
costs to the taxpayers. In addition, losses through corruption and tax evasion need to be
reduced. To achieve these aims, there is a need to further simplifying the licence and fee
structures by reducing the number of  rates and coverage. Fees and licences that have
regulatory functions, such as sand fees, hunting and business licences, should be harmonised
with central government taxes, to avoid double taxation and conflicts with national
development policies such as employment creation and environmental protection.
Furthermore, uniform rates on agricultural taxes (crop cess) are necessary to minimise
distortions. In this context it might be worth considering the possibility to centralise the
collection of  certain local taxes. For instance, cess on export crops could be collected by the
Tanzania Revenue Authority at their points of  export.
More realism is required when it comes to the implementation of  a well functioning property
tax system. An important element of  the fiscal decentralisation process has been to give
municipalities the power to value, asses, bill, collect and enforce property taxes (see McCluskey
et al, 2003). Property tax has many attractions as a local revenue base since it is imposed on
immobile assets and, therefore, is difficult to avoid - at least in principle. However, it has
some obvious weaknesses which need to be taken into consideration before heavy reliance
is placed on it. In particular, problems of  valuation and tax enforcement often occur due to
political interventions and administrative weaknesses. The municipalities’ capacity and
capability to administer the property tax have in general proved to be inadequate. Hence, it
has been difficult for many councils to maintain the current property valuation registers, let
alone to continue the property valuation exercises.  It is, therefore, a need to reassess the
basis of  the property tax in urban councils and to implement a more simple and coherent
approach to the valuation provision, which takes into consideration administrative capacity
and capability constraints facing the councils. Moreover, the experiences from urban councils
advocate cautiousness when extending property tax to district councils.
Some councils have started to explore methods to reduce the financial gap caused by the tax
rationalisation in June 2003 by: (1) outsourcing revenue collection to private collectors to
increase revenues from existing sources (e.g. natural resource products, including charcoal,
wood and other forest products, and livestock auction fees); (2) reducing costs (e.g. by
limiting the number of meetings and workshops and by retrenching surplus staff); and (3)
imposing more cost effective spending (e.g. on electricity and stationeries). Current attempts
for economic diversification will also help to expand the tax base (e.g. a longer term strategy
to introducing new cash crops). Moreover, co-production of  services by councils and local
communities is on the rise. For instance, in several councils recently visited by the research
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team, the increasing number of  primary schools are maintained and expanded via self-help
schemes combined with technical support from the council.
Transparency with respect to budgets and accounts is at the heart of  local government
accountability. Local authorities publish information on revenues collected and allocations
of  funds, as they are obliged to according to the Local Authority Financial Memorandum
1997. However, at present much of  this information does not reach or is not understood by
the general public. Public notices gazetted in newspapers or posted on notice boards at the
council headquarters are often presented in a relatively complicated and technical way which
is hard to understand by ordinary citizens. Many people do not take interest in reading
notices and newspapers. It should be added that the literacy level of many citizens is low. A
main challenge is therefore to provide information on fiscal issues in ways which are
understandable and which reach the general public. The successful dissemination of
information on HIV/AIDS prevention may provide useful lessons for how to design and
disseminate information on budgets and accounts to the communities. Written and oral
methods of  dissemination should be combined, including information submitted at service
outlets such as schools and dispensaries, and at village and ward offices. More active use of
the VEOs and mtaa leaders to communicate such information to citizens might also pay
high dividends as the experiences from Kilosa and Iringa indicated. Urban councils would,
in general, require additional measures compared to rural councils, due to the often high
mobility and turnover of  residents that make it more difficult to reach citizens with such
information.
Improved information to the public on budgets and accounts might improve the
opportunities for citizens to exercise their voice and demand accountability from local
authorities. It is, however, important to stress that encouraging citizens and the civil society
to engage in fiscal and financial monitoring at the local level does not imply that such
measures should replace formal auditing and accounting mechanisms. Nor does it imply
that such measures will weaken the formal accountability mechanisms. On the contrary, it
can strengthen the legitimacy and standing of  local authorities in the communities by
contributing with complementary measures to improved control of  revenue collection and
expenditures.
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